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ABSTRACT
Much of the confusion about the proper regulation of smart contracts
stems from the fact that both code and law are expressed in language.
Natural (human) and formal (computer) languages are profoundly
different, however. Natural language in the form of a true legal contract
expresses human meaning and expectation. Code simply acts, and when
code acts contrary to the understanding of the parties to a contract, courts
must have a theoretical and legal basis in order to intervene—which this
Article provides.
Present scholarship on the governance of smart contracts centers on
logistical problems relating to the effects of automation on operation and
execution, most notably problems of inflexibility and lack of enforcement
discretion. However, automatic execution is nothing new in contract law.
Rather, it is the legal interface between contract law and code that must
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catch and hold our attention. We focus on the point where the ‘natural
language’ of contract law crosses over into the ‘formal language’ of
computer code. Natural language contract terms are made accessible to a
human and receive some sort of confirmation to establish the contractual
magic, a set of bespoke legal rules between two parties encapsulated in
some document or through behavior that makes the intention of the parties
unmistakable. The formal language program portion of a smart contract
executes, sometimes in accordance with these expectations, sometimes not.
This Article asserts that human expectations determine the legal obligations
of a contract, and that code merely executes it. It then explores the legal
bases and ramifications of this human-centered law of smart contracting.
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INTRODUCTION
The brilliant glare of technological advancement sometimes blinds us
to the ways it erodes human autonomy and control. This is potentially the
situation with smart contracts. Smart contracting is a method of executing
agreements using computer code, where such code is stored on a
blockchain platform utilizing distributed ledger technology (DLT).1 While
traditional contracts are centralized—that is, designed to address the
specific intentions of identified parties—smart contracts are decentralized
and automatically generated using predesigned algorithms to bind
pseudonymized parties.
Present scholarship on the governance of smart contracts centers on
logistical problems relating to the effects of automation on operation and
execution; most notably, problems of inflexibility and lack of enforcement
discretion. But automatic execution is nothing new in contract law—we do
it each time we purchase petrol at a pump. Quasi-automated clickwrap
boilerplate contracting is commonplace. Courts deem each of us to have
agreed to a myriad of contracts merely by turning on a device.2 Established
law on automatic execution can be extended to encompass smart contracts.
We must therefore look elsewhere to find what is new and important with
respect to the relationship between law and smart contracts.
The interface between contract law and DLT—the point of conversion
from natural language to code, the place where human intention meets
1. While Blockchain technologies are used in both public and private modes, this Article
will primarily address contractual issues relating to public blockchain platforms. See
generally, Peter Yeoh, Regulatory Issues in Blockchain Technology, 25 J. FIN. REGUL. &
COMPLIANCE 196, 196–97 (2017). Public blockchains are permission-less, in which the
identities of users or even their wallet addresses are not fully traceable to the relevant
real individuals. In comparison, private (permissioned) blockchain ledgers involve users
who identities are known and confirmed. As Yeoh notes, private blockchain ledgers
form a more circumscribed and controlled application of blockchain. Id.; see also Helena
Vieira, Blockchains May Replace the Institutions That Safeguard Commercial Activities,
LONDON SCH. OF ECON.: BUS. REV. (Mar. 31, 2016),
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/2016/03/31/blockchains-may-replace-theinstitutions-that-safeguard-commercial-activities/.
2. See generally JOSHUA A.T. FAIRFIELD, OWNED: PROPERTY, PRIVACY, AND THE NEW DIGITAL
SERFDOM (2017), demonstrating that the confluence of the RAM-copy doctrine, the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, and contract doctrines binding online users by mere use of a
site or service, originating in cases like ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir.
1996), result in the current state of affairs whereby a user is bound by license terms of
service merely by turning on and using a device.
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automated systems—catches and holds our attention. This we call the
smart/contract interface, the point where the natural language of contract
law crosses over into the formal language of computer code, and back
again. Natural language contract terms are made accessible to a human and
receive some sort of confirmation to establish the contractual magic, a set of
bespoke legal rules between signatory parties encapsulated in some
document or through behavior that makes the intention of the parties
unmistakable. The formal language program portion of a smart contract
mechanically executes, but does not intend, nor produce utterances capable
of being interpreted as intention. It simply acts, often in ways that no
human desired, anticipated, or expected.
In such a context, a critical issue for examination is the way in which
contract law should govern the interface between the natural and formal
language of smart contracts. In a situation where contracts are created
through predeveloped algorithms in a decentralized environment, how can
contract law enable human intervention and control? When should a court
be able to undo a transaction executed by smart contract that clearly
contravenes the objectively determinable expectations of the parties? When
should a court be able to invoke traditional contract doctrines such as
unconscionability and undue influence to protect vulnerable individuals?
How should doctrines of frustration of purpose and commercial
impracticability, which cover events that cannot be coded, apply in the
smart contract system? Imagine coding for every outcome of force majeure
and commercial impracticability. The mind boggles!
This Article proceeds in three Parts. In Part I, we review the
discussion around smart contracting language, illustrating how new legal
terms and new legal conceptions, such as the complex of issues around
contracting via DLT, come about. The process is linguistic and
evolutionary, solving problems more often by asking new and better
questions rather than answering old and bad ones. Part II describes some
principles for mediating between natural language contracts expressing
human intention and formal language computer programs, as well as some
problems with translation between the formats. It also describes how courts
can determine when to intervene. Finally, Part III addresses some
principles for mediating between natural language intention and formally
expressed smart contracts as a matter of evolving contract law across the
United States, Australia, and the European Union. It shows that the process
of evolving legal language to deal with the interface problems of smart
contracting is already underway, but is undertheorized.
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This Article thus provides a framework for helping courts
communicate good ideas and develop robust legal rules for handling the
interface between natural language contracts and formal language
programs by: (a) exploring the evolving legal language of smart contracts;
and (b) considering how to operationalize the interface between the
computer program and parties’ intentions.
I.

THE LANGUAGE OF SMART CONTRACTS: TRANSLATING LEGAL PRINCIPLES
INTO CODE
A. How Language Shapes the Creation of Legal Concepts and Terms

The interface between human—natural—language and computer
programs matters, and legal constructions of human encounters with
automatic systems have profound legal significance. Consider, for example,
the experience of a human encountering an automated system. A human
clicks “I agree” to complete a purchase, while possessing certain
expectations regarding the resulting legal relationship. The result of this
encounter is that the human is bound to the computer’s terms. As a thought
experiment, consider the problem the other way around: a human enters
language expressing their understanding of the legal rights and
responsibilities in a contract into a form on an automated contracting site.
Courts generally do not hold the computer bound by any of these human
representations, on the (quite incorrect) view that the computer cannot
understand, or that it cannot be tasked with legal liability because the
automated system cannot understand natural language (again, quite
incorrect).3 This Article asks why humans have ended up as second-class
contracting citizens, and whether there are conceptions of law more
consistent with legal history and reasoning that can reach a different result.
The questions are of particular importance in the face of DLT, because of
the rising tide of claims that the outcome of a smart-contracting process
supersedes human expectations for a given contractual deal. Simply put,
we argue that contract is still the law of satisfying human expectation, not
validating machine outcomes. Where a deal fails because of a bug, an
exploit, the occurrence of a condition the non-occurrence of which was a
basic assumption of the parties, or other emergent problems between
software programs, courts must not lose the plot: human expectations are

3. James Grimmelmann, Spyware vs. Spyware: Software Conflicts and User Autonomy, 16
OHIO ST. TECH. L.J. 25, 47–49 (2020) (describing the lopsided relationship in contracting
that favors technology over users).
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what matter in interpreting the contract, despite all of the jargon around
replacing law with code.
The question of where the handoff occurs between natural language
expressing human expectations of legal relationships and the result of its
encounter with formal computer languages is of decisive import. Courts see
themselves as tasked with determining the arrangement of the parties as
expressed in human language, on the objective theory of contract. Yet they
increasingly rely on the fait accompli of computerized transactions. Courts
dangerously confuse what a computer system did with what the humans
must have wanted.4 For anyone who has ever used a computer and knows
how fast and how far code can vary from human expectation, this is an
absurd direction for contract to take. We set about creating a framework for
diagnosing and correcting this problem.
A few examples help ground the following discussion. Consider an
NFT that is sold at one one-hundredth of its well-established worth—three
thousand dollars, instead of three hundred thousand dollars—due to an
obviously erroneous keypress.5 A human buyer would be held to
understand this was scrivener’s error. As in fact happened, an automated
purchasing bot sniped the purchase in the split second after it was posted,
far faster than the human could correct the typo, and the NFT was
transferred indelibly to a new owner.6
Consider a second example. In the early days of Ethereum, a
distributed autonomous organization (the DAO) sought to receive investor
cryptocurrency and deploy it to a range of projects, the profits of which

4. Ed Felten, Virus With a EULA, FREEDOM TO TINKER (Nov. 15, 2002), https://freedom-totinker.com/2002/11/15/virus-eula/(discussing a virus with an ostensibly enforceable
EULA).
5. Ryan Browne, Bored Ape NFT Reportedly Sells For $3,000 Instead of $300,000 Due to ‘FatFinger’ Mistake, CNBC (Dec. 14, 2021, 8:10 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/12/14/boredape-nft-accidentally-sells-for-3000-instead-of-300000.html (reporting on an NFT being
underpriced due to a clerical mistake).
6. Edward Ongweso Jr, All My Apes Gone: NFT Theft Victims Beg for Centralized Saviors,
VICE (Jan. 6, 2022, 9:38 AM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/y3v3ny/all-my-apes-gonenft-theft-victims-beg-for-centralized-saviors.
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were to be remitted to the investors.7 Through a bug in the code, the
invested cryptocurrency was stolen by a third-party actor.8 The theft was
orchestrated through bugs in the DAO’s smart contracts. 9 Imagine litigation
were to follow: Should courts validate this theft under the understanding
that whatever a computer permits to happen is fair game, even if it results
from exploitation of a software bug? Or will courts look to the intentions of
the parties in creating legal arrangements, and specifically look to the
objectively reasonable human understanding of such legal arrangements,
rather than the vagaries of how code acts when it is actively under attack
by hackers exploiting software bugs?
Finally, a third example. Imagine that person A purchases
cryptocurrency or NFTs from a website, which is complete with terms of
service and automated contract terms à la Amazon. Imagine that person B
purchases the same cryptocurrency or NFTs directly from a smart contract
located on the Ethereum blockchain. Person A will be bound by all kinds of
contractual limitations and restrictions from the website (most notably, in
the US context, they will lose the ability to present their claim in court
pursuant to a forced arbitration clause).10 Person B will not, because the
smart contract was a computer program with which the buyer’s smart
wallet interacted.11 The next step in these cases (this is of course already
happening) is that sellers will attempt to embed legal contract terms of the
sort found on every e-commerce website into computer code itself—to nest
legal language into the executable, or at least to make a kick-out directing a
human to view some sort of pop-up window—to exploit the fact that when
humans and computers contract, computer terms win. What, then will be

7. Nathaniel Popper, A Hacking of More Than $50 Million Dashes Hopes in the World of
Virtual Currency, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/18/business/dealbook/hacker-may-have-removedmore-than-50-million-from-experimental-cybercurrency-project.html?.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (addressing an arbitration
clause banning class actions); see also Rensel v. Centra Tech, Inc., No. 17-24500-CIV, 2018
WL 4410110 at *14 (S.D. Fla. June 14, 2018) (allowing a user to avoid an arbitration
agreement by interacting with a software without using the website).
11. Rensel, 2018 WL 4410110, at *14 (holding that purchaser is not bound by terms
requiring arbitration agreement because tokens purchased via smart contract and not
seller’s website).
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the next level response? Perhaps, as above, the way to avoid the
implementation of contract terms automatically proffered and hidden deep
in code is to use a dumb purchasing bot that itself asserts terms and
conditions and is coded to be incapable of understanding legal language,
only engaging with the formal language of the program, executing the
transaction. This is the world toward which we are skidding, in which
robots must contract with each other, because humans are not permitted to
express their desired preferences in legal language and have them
respected by the courts.
At the root of these everyday problems—examples multiply by the
day—lies the problem of the legal construction of the interface between
natural and formal language, between human ways of understanding what
words mean and machine execution of formal logic.
1. Natural Language, Formal Language, and Machine-Human Language
Hybrids
Courts are confused by the fact that both natural and formal language
systems use words—or rather, appear to a human to do so. When judges
look at machine code, they may see things that look like words, although
they might as well be bricks laid out in a specific pattern guiding specific
action. To a machine, words are either logical directions or trash. Logic is
expressed mechanically, not linguistically, to a computer. Computer
instructions are as easily expressed in physical NAND gates as in
linguistically expressed first-order logic. To unpack why the linguistic
interface between human legal understandings and computerized
automatic execution of contracts presents such a legal conundrum, we must
first examine what natural language is, what it does, and how it works, as
well as what formal language is, what it does, and how it works. Only then
can we see the profound gap in understanding that occurs at the linguistic
interface in contracts.
a. Natural Language: What Law Is and How Words Gain Meaning
Natural language is a process whereby humans use context to give
words meaning so that they can cooperate.12 Human language does not

12. Cooperation at the hundred-million-plus individual scale is the human superpower,
and language is its method. See JOSHUA A.T. FAIRFIELD, RUNAWAY TECHNOLOGY: CAN
LAW KEEP UP (2021).
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have ostensive meaning—there is no vast dictionary in the sky of what
words mean. Rather, words come to have meaning within a given context
through how humans use them.13 Is “bad,” bad? Or is it kind of good?
Which of the 645 meanings of the English word “run” does one mean when
one discusses a run of salmon, a run in pantyhose, or a run on the bank?
Humans ground meaning in context and in a community trying to perform
some task.14 This explains some features of language, how it remains sticky
enough to have meaning (“up” does not mean “down,” and so on); yet,
words change meaning over time as entire languages evolve. Anyone who
has read poetry from 600 years ago can attest to the shifts.
Law is a specific kind of task, drawn from a particular kind of human
linguistic community and context. Through a specific activity—natural
language—humans evolve symbols, cooperative fictions like money,
corporations, nation-states, fairness, and even the rule of law itself to permit
cooperation at the multi-billion-person scale.15 Contracts are a concentrated
version of this task, and are historically grounded in the context of consent:
By expressing in objective language the goals, intentions, and methods of
cooperation, and using the broader cooperative fiction of the state to
enforce the narrower cooperative fiction of the contract, parties could
replace physical coercion with a socially-backed negotiated agreement—
the fabled shift from status to contract. 16
Contracts are, relatively speaking, a recent development in the law.17
And contracts themselves are not immune to this process of shifting
meaning, either internally to the contract, or externally. Externally,
contracts have shifted meaning—where once they were the law of

13. See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 1–5 (G.E.M. Anscombe
trans., 3d ed. 1974) (arguing that word meanings are based on how they are used within
a community to complete a task).
14. See id. at 1–5.
15. See YUVAL NOAH HARARI, SAPIENS: A BRIEF HISTORY OF HUMANKIND (2015).
16. See, e.g., R.H. Graveson, The Movement from Status to Contract, 4 MOD. L. REV. 261, 261–
72 (1941) (discussing “Sir Henry Maine’s famous generalization of the movement up to
his time of progressive societies from status to contract.”).
17. The first known use of “contract” as a noun occurred in the 14th century.
Contract, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/contract (last
visited Feb. 18, 2021).
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negotiated agreement, now the practical import of most contracts is that
they are not negotiated at all, but are instead embedded in mandatory
technology structures that remove choice from the technologically
disadvantaged party, the consumer who clicks “I Agree,” the employee
who signs an arbitration agreement preventing them from suing for sexual
assault, and so on.18
Internally, contractual meaning shifts as well, although this analysis is
trickier. Lawyers want to control the meaning of words inside a contract by
defining them. They capitalize them or use quotation marks to show certain
words in a contract are more like the logically determined signifiers of
computer code, below, and less like living artifacts of meaning. But even
the most tightly sewn-up contract cannot be protected against the fact that
a contract is comprised of natural language words. The parties’ course of
dealing or course of performance give meaning to words.19 The court
construes contractual terms in light of some other community of meaning—
Black’s Law Dictionary, Webster’s Dictionary, or industry custom and
practice.20
The problem begins when courts and programmers misunderstand the
nature of contracts and contractual language. The legacy of legal
positivism—the idea that law is a closed and formal system, susceptible of
logical, context-free manipulation—has left scholars and practitioners with
a fundamental misunderstanding of the relationship between law and the
natural language environments that give its words meaning.21 Take core
legal concepts like freedom, privacy, security, even the concept of a
constitution—each is a heatmap of overlapping meanings, used by humans
in different contexts to express a cluster of purposes and goals. It is not
without irony that the legal profession relies on its own community and
context to create legal meanings, legal fictions, the legal language that ties
18. See Latif v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 18cv11528 (DLC), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107020
(S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2019) (upholding arbitration in face of New York law that precluded
arbitration in employer-employee sexual harassment cases).
19. See Figgie Int’l, Inc. v. Destileria Serralles, Inc.,190 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating that
industry customs or typical use may supplement express contract terms under the
Uniform Commercial Code).
20. Id.
21. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593,
601–02 n.25 (1958) (describing a legal system as a “closed logical system” in which legal
decisions are deduced from predetermined legal rules).
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the entire profession together, while still too often claiming that words in
legal documents are susceptible to precise definition and formal use. This
professional proclivity to mistake the narrow and specific activity of legal
term definition for the social processes that generated linguistic fictions like
constitutions, nation-states, corporations, money, time, days of the week,
and other consensual hallucinations of legal social fiction sets the stage for
mistaking code for legal language, the fundamental error nestled within the
present smart contracts debate. Our guild sensibilities explain why lawyers
are likely to accept the project of reducing laws to computer code as
plausible—and even advise clients that it is possible to do so—when it is
demonstrably not.
b. Formal Language: Words are Mechanical
Formal logics, such as first-order logic, number theory, and eventually
computer languages, do not use words. Humans input signs that look like
words in order to express directions for a machine. These directions are best
thought of as physical; indeed, computers and their code can be fully
expressed as a series of physical objects. There is no requirement for
meaning, only logical consistency. The fundamental rule of computation is
that no system of logic may lead to a theorem that states N = !N, or, in
English, N equals not-N.22
A result of the rigid, mechanical method of symbol manipulation is
that formal languages are consistent but at the cost of completeness, as Kurt
Gödel proved.23 His result was instrumental to one of the fundamental
rules of computation, the Church-Turing Thesis, which states the limits of
effective computability.24 For practical purposes, these results prevent the
creation of bug-free software, and impose strong limits on the kind of
problems computers can solve.

22. See Richard Zach, Hilbert’s Program Then and Now, in 5 HANDBOOK ON THE PHIL. OF SCI.
411, 431 (Dale Jacquette ed., 2007) (“Gödel announced the second incompleteness
theorem in an abstract published in October 1930: no consistency proof of systems such
as Principia, Zermelo Fraenkel set theory, or the systems investigated by Ackermann and
von Neumann is possible by methods which can be formulated in these systems.”).
23. Id.
24 See generally DOUGLAS R. HOFSTADTER, GÖDEL, ESCHER, BACH: AN ETERNAL GOLDEN
BRAID (20th ed., 2000).
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First, a formal language cannot be used to guarantee bug-free code.25
There is only one way to know whether an algorithm will halt—will reach
an answer—or whether it will continue grinding on for infinity, consuming
infinite resources: run the code.26 We cannot run code B to see whether code
A will hang or yield an answer because the only thing code B could do is
run code A.27
Second, the Church-Turing thesis limits the complexity that
computation can effectively resolve. Certain problems cannot be resolved
within a reasonable period of time, particularly those for which each
additional input exponentially increases the number of potential solutions
to be checked. The traveling salesman problem provides an example:
imagine a salesman is traveling to 100 cities—what is the shortest route
between them he can take? This requires checking a gargantuan number of
routes. And if one adds an additional city to the list, the number of routes
to be checked increases exponentially.28
In short, computer programs cannot be guaranteed to be bug-free, and
they do not handle complex problems of optimization well. Here we begin
to see some of the give-and-take at the natural-machine language interface.
Natural language can express any statement; so it is complete at the cost of
consistency.29 And natural language can evolve to express truths within
frameworks that did not exist previously:30 The scholastics never answered
how many angels could dance on the head of a pin; scientists learned to ask
new questions in new frames of inquiry.
Further, natural language handles social problems of enormous
complexity, the least of which would stump a supercomputer. An
algorithm can “learn” the word-contexts in which humans use a given word
(this is how google translate functions) as a machine-human language
hybrid, but no algorithm can handle the complexities of social nuance that
give meaning to #metoo or Black Lives Matter, for example.

25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See generally Merrill M. Flood, The Traveling-Salesman Problem, 4 OPERATIONS RSCH. 61
(1956), https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.4.1.61.
29. See Zach, supra note 22.
30. See WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 13.
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What this means for contracting is simple: humans express meaning in
natural language; computers parse actions in systems of symbolic direction.
The overlap between these systems is more accidental than essential. When
we turn to the question of legal doctrine and reading smart contracts, we
see the problem: there is a temptation to state that the code expresses
human preference, that the code is the contract. It is not, nor can it be. It is
not written in a language susceptible to expressing meaning within a
context. Computers do not express meaning; they do not read meaning.
They can only create meaning if they are seen, as Bruno Latour sees them,
as part of a community of meaning with humans—objects alone do not
generate language—and even then, their impact on language is parasitic
and derivative.31
Humans of course can express meaning when they program, in the
sense that they may have a goal. But again, the performance of the code is
not equal to the intent of the coder. Code has bugs, and even perfectly
designed code may have unexpected interactions with other code. In that
gap—and it is a large gap—between intention and expression lies most of
the human law of contract.
Consider an increasingly common event: a blockchain that, through a
revision in the code, creates a bug whereby users can exploit the database
to mint millions of new tokens. The entire purpose of a cryptocurrency
blockchain or NFT smart contract is to create rarity and digital scarcity. If
millions of bitcoin could be created with the press of a button, bitcoin would
be worth nothing. The focus of blockchain software is to prevent fraudulent
double spending and to impede the creation of tokens under
circumstances—like these—that ruin the scarcity or uniqueness of a token.
(There are sites that attempt to do precisely this, by duplicating any extant
NFT and issuing a token on an inexpensive chain, as an attempt to show
some of the difficulties in the scarcity model underlying NFTs.32

31. See BRUNO LATOUR, REASSEMBLING THE SOCIAL: AN INTRODUCTION TO ACTORNETWORK THEORY 71 (2005) (describing objects as actors because they “make a difference
in the course of some other agent’s action”).
32. See Lisa Gibbons, There is a Way to Protect NFTs From Being Replicated or Lost: This
Company Does Just That, COINTELEGRAPH (Oct. 28, 2021),
https://cointelegraph.com/news/there-is-a-way-to-protect-nfts-from-being-replicated-orlost-this-company-does-just-that (describing the solution of NFT replication and
solutions to the problem).
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Under such circumstances, natural language conflicts irreconcilably
with computation. More bugs and exploits that compromise the scarcity of
cryptocurrency and NFTs are found every day, especially in proof-of-stake
systems where the same software is run on each node responsible for
minting new tokens, such that a single bug can easily ramify back into the
entire system. Exploiting such a bug destroys the rarity of the currency.33
These bugs are the equivalent of issuing every person in the country a
photocopier that could perfectly duplicate cash. Exploitation of emergent
code properties (bugs, etc.) undermines and irrevocably damages the
human expectations of a community reliant on digital scarcity. Contract law
protects that expectation.
2. Potential Paradigms for the Human-Machine Language Interface
What paradigm, then, should we follow when bugs in code contravene
clearly delineated human expectations? Should courts continue to privilege
dumb statements of language by unmeaning machines—an “I Agree”
contract conveyed by a computer to a human—over evidence regarding
how the human or humans meant to arrange legal arrangements between
them? Can there be any room or mechanism for humans to express meaning
to machines, other than machine refusal to contract on any text it itself does
not offer? What happens when legal language is buried deep in code?
The job of courts is particularly complex in light of tech evangelists’
push to have the effect of the technology read as the intent of humans using
it.34 Consider the above-described case of the NFT seller who listed an NFT
for one one-hundredth of the fair market value—a slip of the human finger
immediately pounced on by bid-sniping software. The seller adopted an
almost masochistic pose—NFTs are just like that, he seemed to say; by
choosing to contract in NFTs, he felt that he had acceded to a system where
the operation of code supervened the human expectations of the parties.35
This is the first paradigm of the natural-formal language interface:
formal languages win. If a smart contract operates in such a way as to

33. See Dan Goodin, Really Stupid “Smart Contract” Bug Let Hackers Steal $31 Million in
Digital Coin, ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 1, 2021, 3:41 PM), https://arstechnica.com/informationtechnology/2021/12/hackers-drain-31-million-from-cryptocurrency-service-monoxfinance/.
34. See Samer Hassan & Primavera De Filippi, The Expansion of Algorithmic Governance:
From Code is Law to Law is Code, 17 FIELD ACTIONS SCI. REPS., SPECIAL ISSUE 88, 89 (2017).
35. See Browne, supra note 5.
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contravene clearly expressed human expectations, what of it? Moreover,
imagine if enterprising lawyers chose to transact business this way: “By
using this service, you agree that all transactions are final and valid as
executed by the Code.” The parties could wrap code in contracts, to the
following effect: “The Parties agree to transact as determined by the
following code.” The difficulty is that exploits, bugs, fraud, and outright
bad faith exploitation will follow from such systems. This is precisely what
happened in the case of the early DAO: other distributed autonomous
organizations siphoned off the value placed by investors in the original
program.36
The second paradigm fits more closely with historical law and practice,
and falls far closer to the recommendations and experience with the law
and practice of smart contracts reflected in our practical analysis below.
Here, human expectation governs without giving much power to the idea
that whatever the code does is what the humans intended. Because we can
never have guaranteed bug-free code, the interactions within and between
pieces of software guarantee emergent behavior that no human expected.37
Human expectation must still be objectively interpreted, of course, but the
grounds of objectivity lie in the context, community, and task that the
contracting parties sought to accomplish.38
This paradigm is far more consistent with law because it tracks the
discipline of contract as a legal mechanism for securing cooperation
through understanding, negotiation, and consent. The drawback of such an
approach is that it varies far from modern contracting practice, which has
thrown any concept of human consent by the wayside in favor of sticking
the human half of a human-computer transaction with all legal detriment
and no legal benefit by virtue of having communicated intention to the
machine. Humans no longer negotiate anything in computer-assisted
contracting.
There is an additional layer of complexity in machine-to-machine
contracting, creating a modern (although vastly more difficult) version of
the battle-of-the-forms problems that plagued industrial contracting. If the

36. See A Legal Analysis of the DAO Exploit and Possible Investor Rights, NASDAQ (June 21,
2016, 12:52 PM), https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/a-legal-analysis-of-the-dao-exploitand-possible-investor-rights-2016-06-21.
37. See HOFSTADTER, supra note 24.
38. See WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 13.
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present legal trend—not holding machines responsible for natural
language, but holding humans responsible for technical operation—
continues, more humans will resort to machine contracting to protect
themselves. In practice, then, we see emerging meta-contracts at the level
of whatever human or corporation can be tasked with responsibility for a
machine operant, and then machines contracting at a sublayer. These
contractual arrangements are often placed in apps or website terms of
service, human attention traps, an attempt to leverage the rule that if a
human could have seen the legal terms, they must be operative between
even machine counterparties. This merges with the practical reality of
crypto communities. Such communities often want some kind of nearly
constitutional commitment to the blockchain and the community: promises
not to exploit the code, promises to give exploited currency back, indeed,
contractual recognition that exploited currencies are not the property of the
exploiter, and are properly subject to seizure and deletion by the
community (usually through the mechanism of a hard fork or its
equivalent), and so on.
A final issue is that contract law will inevitably shift in light of these
new transactional forms. Yet the means and path of a legal shift in the face
of technology is not the same in every culture. Linguistic and cultural shifts
translate into legal shifts in profoundly different ways. We focus on
common law jurisdictions (courts at the EU level follow common-law
processes) because the method of reasoning by narrative and analogy is
particularly adapted to the experimental, iterative approach that permits
rapid prototyping of legal rules in the face of technological shift. We
recognize that civil jurisdictions often produce superior rules in the face of
technological shift, largely because they rely on expertise rather than raw
monetary investment in law-changing litigation.39 Perhaps some hybrid is
called for: the EU’s success (its legislative branches remain closely tied to
civil law systems) in the face of surveillance capitalism’s unprecedented
drive to exploit citizens’ data might serve as a model. In light of these
considerations, we consider common law doctrines from a number of

39. For example, compare the abdication of the United States on questions of personal
data privacy with the now-dominant worldwide privacy regime tested in the EU data
privacy directive and iterated some two decades later in the GDPR.
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countries. Our purpose is not merely to chart what is, but to provide a
doctrinal and theoretical basis for predicting and guiding the future.
B. The Nature and Operation of Blockchain Smart Contracts
Blockchain technologies integrate innovations from the fields of
distributed computing and cybersecurity to create immutable, trusted, and
decentralized data-storage systems.40 As noted, a smart contract is an
automated agreement hosted on a blockchain platform that autonomously
executes transactions on the occurrence of certain predetermined
conditions. An automated agreement is a method of exchanging value
where some aspect of the exchange is processed by a computer without
human verification or approval.41 The code is located on the blockchain and
recorded on the ledger. All parties obtain a copy of the code. But, once
registered, the blockchain cannot be modified. The general objectives of
smart contract design are to satisfy common contractual conditions (such
as payment terms, liens, confidentiality and even enforcement), minimize
exceptions (both malicious and accidental), and minimize the need for
trusted intermediaries. In simplest terms, a smart contract is “a piece of
code on a blockchain.”42
The rise of DAOs facilitated DAO smart contracts, computer programs
that operate on peer-to-peer networks and incorporate rules for governance
and decision-making.43 It supported the creation of self-executing smart
contracts by enabling the collection, verification, validation, and
enforcement of terms which have been previously agreed upon by parties.44
Such contracts are considered trustworthy because they are stored on

40. See generally Arvind Narayanan & Jeremy Clark, Bitcoin’s Academic Pedigree, 60
COMMC’ NS ACM 36 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1145/3132259. As to the distinction between
public and private blockchain ledgers, see Yeoh, supra note 1, at 196–97.
41. Jake Goldenfein & Andrea Leiter, Legal Engineering on the Blockchain: ‘Smart Contracts’
as Legal Conduct, 29 L. & CRITIQUE 141, 143 (2018); MARIA GRAZIA VIGLIOTTI & HAYDN
JONES, THE EXECUTIVE GUIDE TO BLOCKCHAIN 135 (2020).
42. See Rajesh Gupta et al., HaBiTs: Blockchain-based Telesurgery Framework for Healthcare
4.0, 2019 INT’L CONF. ON COMPUT., INFO. & TELECOMM. SYS. 1 (2019).
43. Madhusudan Singh & Shiho Kim, Blockchain Technology for Decentralized Autonomous
Organizations, 115 ADVANCES IN COMPUTS. 115, 116–17 (2019).
44. Vimal Dwivedi et al., Legally Enforceable Smart-Contract Languages: A Systematic
Literature Review, 54 ACM COMPUTING SURVS. 1, 2 (2021).
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encrypted, distributed, and immutable ledgers.45 The decentralised system
enables parties to conduct transactions without reliance on central
organisational entities or external legal systems. These features cause
blockchain-based smart contracts to be verifiable, observable, and
enforceable, and uphold privity.
The term smart contract was coined in 1994 by Nick Szabo, who
described it as “[a] computerised transaction protocol that executes the
terms of a contract”46 and later as “a set of promises, specified in digital
form, including protocols within, which the parties perform on these
promises.”47 The development of blockchain technologies in 2009, primarily
to support cryptocurrencies, involved new protocols that also facilitated the
development of blockchain-based smart contracts and helped realise
Szabo’s early vision. While blockchain platforms were initially deployed to
establish cryptocurrencies, they progressed to support a wide variety of
commercial transactions, including syndicated lending and securities
transactions.48
Consistent with the rapid escalation in the sophistication and scale of
smart contracts, there has been an increase in the complexity of smart
contract language.49 De Filippi and Hassan divide the increasing complexity

45. As noted above, blockchains are examples of distributed ledger technologies. They
are databases, maintained on many computers, to which anyone can write, but no-one
can falsify, at least under standard cryptographic and game-theoretic conditions. See
Joshua A.T. Fairfield, BitProperty, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 805, 816–819 (2015).
46. See Nick Szabo, Smart Contracts,
https://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/rob/Courses/InformationInSpeech/CDROM/Literature/LOT
winterschool2006/szabo.best.vwh.net/smart_contracts_2.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2019).
47. Id.
48. Maher Alharby & Aad van Moorsel, Blockchain-Based Smart Contracts: A Systematic
Mapping Study, ARXIV (Oct. 17, 2017), https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.06372.
49. Goldenfein interestingly suggests that the present challenge of creating a legal
framework to govern blockchain, echoes the process of systemising writs during the
Medieval times. Goldenfien & Leiter, supra note 41, at 144–45. He terms early writs as
‘technological artefacts’ as they translated physical reality into the engineered register of
the writs. In this way they operated to connect human conduct to the institutional
systems of the courts. Id. at 144. In a similar way, Goldenfein argues, blockchain systems
create a library of possible engagements with the techno-legal world. Id. In this Article,
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of smart contracts into four distinct phases.50 The first phase involved the
digitization of information, converting paper text into data and creating
large databases. The second phase involved the automation of
decisionmaking processes, such as governmental processes in the field of
tax assessment and private sector accounting and credit assessment tools.
This was followed by the third phase of incorporating legal rules into
software code, leading to the concept of regulation by code. This concept,
termed “lex informatica,”51 was further developed by Lessig in his thesis
that “code is law.”52
The fourth, and currently unfolding, phase identified by De Filippi and
Hassan is the codification of law involving blockchain platforms.53 This
phase is distinguished by the transition from reliance on code to enforce
laws to reliance on code to also draft and elaborate upon such law. They
argue that blockchain has been the driver of this fourth and most dynamic
phase of the evolving relationship between law and code.
Another commentator has observed that today’s smart contracts differ
from previous forms of automated exchange54 in the complexity of the
arrangements, with this new class of smart contracts including transfers of
real property, intellectual property rights, and licences.55 This in turn
requires more complex systems to integrate such smart contracts with real
world organisational and institutional systems. And as smart contract
transactions become more commercially valuable, mechanisms have also
been developed to contest and reverse smart contracts. Thus, in addition to
we further suggest that the critical connection between the technical and legal
environments is language which converts legal rights and duties into code.
50. Hassan & De Filippi, supra note 34, at 88–89.
51. Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through
Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 554–55 (1998).
52. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 5 (1999).
53. Hassan & De Filippi, supra note 34, at 89–90.
54. Vending machines and automated parking station are early examples of automated
transactions. See Jonathan Rohr, Smart Contracts in Traditional Contract Law, Or: The Law of
the Vending Machine, 67 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 67, 69–70 (2019) (drawing comparisons between
vending machines and smart contracts).
55. Sinclair Davidson et al., Blockchains and the Economic Institutions of Capitalism, 14 J. OF
INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 639, 646 (2018).
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creating a relationship between software code and internal processes, it is
also necessary to connect the smart contracts to off-chain real world dispute
resolution processes.
Smart contracts produce a variety of well-documented economic
benefits, including efficiency,56 immutability, security, convenience, and the
execution of transactions in a “trustless environment.”57 By eliminating the
need for relationships of trust between contracting parties, blockchainbased smart contracts serve to coordinate individuals, including large
groups of individuals, that do not know or trust each other.58 The
eradication of the need for trust between parties also extends to central
authorities because blockchain vitiates the need to rely on or trust such
external organizations.59 And smart contracts enable industrial society to
operate more effectively by reducing reliance on intermediaries and
decreasing the transaction costs.60 Of course, immutability does not always
support trust because, while blockchain guarantees that a transaction was
recorded, it does not guarantee that the maker of the transaction was the
lawful proprietor of the private key.61
As to blockchain’s claims regarding security, secure smart contracts
can build a secure global contracting environment, facilitating more
efficient international commerce.62 Researchers have constructed a security

56. See Sinclair Davidson et al., Economics of Blockchain, SSRN (Mar. 9, 2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2744751; see generally Rainer Böhme
et al., Bitcoin: Economics, Technology and Governance, 29 J. OF ECON. PERSPS. 213 (2015).
57. Eghbal Ghazizadeh & Tong Sun, A Systematic Literature Review of Smart Contract
Applications, 2020 PROC. OF THE FUTURE TECHS. CONF. 877, 881 (2020).
58. See Primavera De Filippi & Samer Hassan, Blockchain Technology as a Regulatory
Technology: From Code is Law to Law is Code, FIRST MONDAY (Nov. 14, 2016),
https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/7113.
59. See Yeoh, supra note 1, at 196.
60. See Max Raskin, The Law and Legality of Smart Contracts, 1 GEO. L. TECH. L. REV. 305,
309 (2017).
61. See Kevin Werbach, Trust, But Verify: Why the Blockchain Needs Law, 33 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 489, 494–96 (20162018) (discussing the theft of Ether and how the immutability of
blockchain records prevented stopping or reversing the theft).
62. See generally RICHARD MA ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF SMART CONTRACT SECURITY (Lisa
MacLean ed., 2019), for a discussion of the security vulnerabilities associated with smart

99

2022

UCLA J.L. & TECH.

Vol. 27:2

framework to connect people, systems, and processes, creating an
institutional governance model for investigating technical errors and
vulnerabilities.63 Others have further examined the problems created by the
leaking of private data and its potential criminal exploitation.64 One
commentator, in outlining the benefits of smart contracts, notes their
potential to lower losses generated by fraud.65 Another notes that smart
contracts enable the creation of “pools of resources and their allocation
according to agreed criteria,” facilitating innovative financial activities such
as crowdfunding.66 Finally, in relation to enforcement, the economic
benefits of smart contracts have been said to include avoiding the cost of
arbitration proceedings and court enforcement costs.67
However, as has been widely noted, smart contracts are, in many
circumstances, accompanied by certain legal uncertainties and
vulnerabilities. Due to a lack of common understanding between lawyers
and computer programmers, many legal loopholes exist in present smart
contracts. It is therefore critical to align the formal language of computing
with the natural language of contract law. This littoral zone between the
virtual and the real, between the automated and the non-automated, and
between formal and natural language, will be the focus of the next Subpart
of the Article.
C. The Evolving Techno-Legal Smart Contract Language
The legality of smart contracts depends on properly connecting the
formal language of computational transactions to the natural language of

contracts. The authors argue that while blockchains are secure, smart contracts are not,
and presents a variety of smart contract principles and practices that can help strengthen
security.
63. See id.
64. See Yilei Wang et al., Randomness Invalidates Criminal Smart Contracts, 477, INFO. SCI.
291 (2019).
65. Nick Szabo, Smart Contracts, PHONETIC SCIS. (1994),
https://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/rob/Courses/InformationInSpeech/CDROM/Literature/LOT
winterschool2006/szabo.best.vwh.net/smart.contracts.html.
66. Alexander Savelyev, Contract Law 2.0: ‘Smart’ Contracts as the Beginning of the End of
Classic Contract Law, 26 INFO. & COMMC’ NS. Tech. L. 116, 120-122 (2017).
67. See Szabo, supra note 65.
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contracts.
In this techno-legal blockchain-based smart contract
environment, technical standards, guidelines, and protocols are the
language that mediates between code and law. This language is created by
hybrid techno-legal instruments and operates to model the potential actions
and behaviors of parties to smart contracts and create packages to govern
both technical and legal transactions. This language is critical in supporting
compatibility and interoperability between the smart contract software and
the law of contract. Thus, it is important to get it right.
A variety of smart contract languages (SCLs) have been developed to
translate contractual concepts and principles into code, and some valuable
research has been conducted by computer engineers on the operation and
merits of the various SCLs. DAO smart contracts are characterised by their
incorporation of sophisticated rules as to governance and decisionmaking.68 SCLs implementing self-executing smart contracts include
Solidity, Michelson, and Rholang.69
Each SCL has semantic peculiarities and spectres of use.70 For example,
domain-specific SCLs are commonly used to support online voting and
crowdfunding.71 In contrast, formally verifiable SCLs provide sophisticated
semantics for framing contractual obligations and rights. So-called “easyto-use” SCLs translate high-level Solidity Code into low-level Bytecode,
making it easier to apply the language.72
But how successful is a particular SCL language at capturing the
intentions of parties, including ensuring that the smart contracts retain their
desired level of flexibility and discretion? How successful are such
technical standards and guidelines in ensuring that transactions comply
with the principles of contract law? In the field of computing, substantial

68. See Singh & Kim, supra note 43, at 116–17.
69. See further Dwivedi et al., supra note 44, at 2 (discussing Solidity, Michelson, and
Rholand); cf. KEVIN SOLORIO ET AL., HANDS-ON SMART CONTRACT DEVELOPMENT WITH
SOLIDITY AND ETHEREUM: FROM FUNDAMENTALS TO DEPLOYMENT (O'Reilly 2020)
(discussing Solidity).
70. See Dwivedi et al., supra note 44, at 2.
71. See Ilya Sergey et al., Safer Smart Contract Programming with Scilla, 3 PROC. ACM ON
PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES 1, 2 (2019), https://doi.org/10.1145/3360611.
72. See Dwivedi et al., supra note 44, at 19.
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work is being done to develop mechanized means of validating formal
syntax and semantics, such as Solidity and Lolisa.73
Moving from the technical to the legal, lawyers’ unfamiliarity with the
technology and the programmers’ unfamiliarity with law have made smart
contracts an uncertain and little-researched area of law. As a variety of
computing scholars have noted,74 although blockchain supports the
drafting of legal contracts, “the underlying contractual concepts and
properties necessary to render said smart contracts legally binding (which
[computer scholars] refer to as “suitability”), are still less researched.”75 The
relationship between software code and the natural language is often
unclear. And in the case of immutable blockchain smart contracts, it is also
inflexible and opaque. Within this context, the next two Subparts consider
how the language of smart contracts differs from traditional contracts, and
analyze how such differences lead to challenges in seamlessly applying
established contractual principles and protections. Rather than seek to
consider all concepts and principles of contract law, the Subparts will focus
on two specific concepts that are particularly difficult to apply and uphold
in the environment of blockchain smart contracts: discerning intent and
determining when a contract has been properly performed.
D. The Challenge of Articulating Intent in Smart Contracts
A defining feature of a smart contract is its establishment of consensus
between parties who may not know or trust each other. This feature,
however, gives rise to certain legal challenges related to discerning intent
and establishing consent.
While the smart contract establishes
technological consensus, to be valid under contract law, it must also
embody the genuine contractual consent of all individuals to the

73. See id. at 16 (discussing Solidity and Lolisa); cf. Karthikeyan Bhargavan et al., Formal
Verification of Smart Contracts: Short Paper, in PLAS ‘16: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2016 ACM
WORKSHOP ON PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES AND ANALYSIS FOR SECURITY 91 (2016),
https://doi.org/10.1145/2993600.2993611 (discussing Solidity).
74. See, e.g., Usman W. Chohan, The Decentralized Autonomous Organization and Governance
Issues, in NOTES ON THE 21ST CENTURY 1 (2017), https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3082055; Mark
Giancaspro, Is a ‘Smart Contract’ Really a Smart Idea? Insights from a Legal Perspective, 33
COMPUT. L. & SEC. REV. 825 (Dec. 2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.clsr.2017.05.007;
Goldenfein & Leiter, supra note 41.
75. See Dwivedi et al., supra note 44, at 2.
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transaction. One commentator frames this problem as the tension created
between the establishment of “decentralised consensus” and information
distribution.76 This idea could also be defined as the challenge of
reconciling “decentralised consensus” with individual intent. These two
are not easy to reconcile—while the validity of contracts is dependent on
the proper application of the contractual principles of offer, acceptance,
consideration, and capacity, smart contracts are drafted within the
limitations of smart contract language. Moreover, while blockchain
systems do maintain detailed records of individual transactions that can be
used to establish the required intent and consent to terms, many algorithms
supporting such decentralised systems come down to some form of
majority vote.77 This problem is exacerbated if a hacking incident causes the
blockchain platform to be modified to maintain security, causing forking
and a change to the underlying system.78 This then calls into question the
continuing relevance of the initial consent of parties.
Moreover, even if a contract evinces an intention by all parties to enter
the contract and accept its terms, the contractual doctrines of mistake,
unconscionability, duress, and undue influence allow for contract to be
rescinded if it can be shown that such consent was illegally obtained, or that
the contract as executed contravenes objectively discernible intentions of
the parties or valuable social norms (e.g. unconscionability). In the case of
smart contracts, there is a high likelihood that the parties will
misunderstand or abuse the terms of the blockchain agreement. This is
accentuated when such agreements involve members of the general public
(such as in crowdfunding situations) who may have limited understanding
of the operation of smart contracts and how they differ from online
consumer contracts (such as those relating to online shopping). In
determining the capacity of a party to a contract, the court in Saunders v.

76. Lin W. Cong & Zhiguo He, Blockchain Disruption and Smart Contracts, 32 REV. FIN.
STUD. 1754, 1755 (2019), https://academic.oup.com/rfs/article/32/5/1754/5427778.
77. See id. at 1761.
78. See Stephen Penzo & Niloufer Selvadurai, A Hard Fork in the Road: Developing an
Effective Regulatory Framework for Public Blockchains, INFO. & COMMC’NS TECH. L. (July 27,
2021), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13600834.2021.195972; see also
Angela Walch, The Bitcoin Blockchain as Financial Market Infrastructure: A Consideration of
Operational Risk, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 837, 866–67 (2015).
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Anglia Building Society held that an inability to properly understand
computer code does not constitute an “innate capacity.”79 Nonetheless, the
inability to understand code could, under the right circumstances,
constitute an incapacity that vitiates consent. This would be consistent with
cases such as Petelin v. Cullen80 which have held that an inability to
understand English amounted to an incapacity.81
Additionally, the law relating to third-party beneficiaries in smart
contracts is also under-theorized. Many blockchains are managed by
foundations, or at least have interests that are promoted by foundations.
Those foundations pre-mine currency, sell some of it, and try to set terms
and conditions of use. For example, a proof-of-stake chain might have a
transactional wallet with terms and conditions built into the End User
License Agreement (EULA) which arguably benefit other members of the
community. If someone dupes the currency, it is unclear whether
community members whose holdings are diluted can sue on that contract.
Lawyers are trained to eliminate third-party beneficiaries from online
contracts, but in smart contracts, the insertion of express third-party
beneficiary clauses may be necessary.
E. The Language of Smart Contract Performance and Breach
While blockchain platforms offer the benefits of immutability, the
corollary is that smart contracts only encompass perfect performance. The
extensive scholarly literature on the inflexibility of smart contracts,82 while
focused on the logistics of execution, also demonstrates this problem. One
commentator points out that while smart contracts create rights, they do

79. Saunders v. Anglia Bldg. Soc’y [1971] AC 1004 (HL) 1016 (appeal taken from Eng.).
80. Petelin v Cullen (1975) 132 CLR 355, 359–360 (Austl.).
81. See also Gabriel Olivier Benjamin Jaccard, Smart Contracts and the Role of Law,
JUSLETTER IT (Nov. 23, 2017), https://jusletter-it.weblaw.ch/en/issues/2017/23-November2017/smart-contracts-and-_42155d7e26.html__ONCE&login=false (subscription
required).
82. See José Carlos Pereira, The Genesis of the Revolution in Contract Law: Smart Legal
Contracts, in ICEGOV2019: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 12TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ELECTRONIC GOVERNANCE 374 (2019),
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3326365.3326414; see also Judah A. Druck, “Smart
Contracts” Are Neither Smart Nor Contracts, 37 NO. 10 BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP.,
Oct. 2018, at 5, 7; see also KRISTIAN LAUSLAHTI ET AL., SMART CONTRACTS – HOW WILL
BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY AFFECT CONTRACTUAL PRACTICES? 9 (Rsch. Inst. Finnish Econ.,
ETLA Reports No. 68, 2017).
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not create legal obligations as understood by traditional contract law. The
concept of obligation is not limited to specific rights or duties, but
encompasses the whole relationship between the parties and serves to
regulate human interactions. In comparison, a smart contract involves the
self-limiting of rights through technical means. Hence, once the smart
contract is entered into, it is not feasible to change the terms, such as those
governing place and time of performance, even in response to unforeseen
events. This creates a direct conflict with doctrines like commercial
impracticability or force majeure.
Further, it is not possible for the terms governing breach of contract to
be interpreted in response to events that have not specifically been
addressed in the smart contract terms. The embedding of obligations in
immutable code means that traditional doctrines of frustration and
impossibility will not apply. For example, if an event took place that
rendered the smart contract unperformable, but that had not been foreseen
and embedded in the code, a party would be in breach regardless of the
impossibility of performance. Hence, a cyber-attack that results in the
inability of one or more parties to perform the contract will not change the
terms of the smart contract. Given the variations in possible cyber-attacks
and the many ways in which such a cyber-attack could affect the terms of
the contract, it will often be impossible to plan for all such contingencies
when setting up the smart contract.
Even where both parties wish to modify the smart contract, such as in
response to a changed commercial circumstance, the blockchain system will
not typically permit such amendments to rights and duties. This raises
critical issues relating to the application of established contractual
principles, such as those governing force majeure events. This is
unsatisfactory as both consumers and companies want some flexibility in
commercial dealings, and may wish to avoid a breach situation by
renegotiating certain terms.83 In such circumstances, while it would of
course be possible to create a new smart contract, the initial smart contract
would continue its self-execution on the basis of the predetermined terms.
This limitation of the capacity to modify is exacerbated because the
language of smart contracts also does not typically allow ambiguity. In a

83. See Danielle D’Onfro, Smarts Contracts and the Illusion of Automated Enforcement, 61
WASH. U.J. L. & POL’Y 173, 182–83 (2020) (discussing why consumers and corporations
value such flexibility.).
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traditional contract, parties may use widely defined terms and deliberately
vague language to encompass a myriad of unforeseen circumstances. Such
a use of language, while reducing certainty, has the benefit of providing
flexibility regarding operation of the contract. But as one commentator has
observed, while “[a]mbiguity is celebrated in human language . . .
[a]mbiguity is anathema to computer language.”84
Finally, remedies for breach of contract, including damages, penalties,
and equitable remedies such as injunctions and specific performance,
would be unavailable unless expressly provided for in the terms of the
blockchain. This has the potential for a smart contract to limit contractual
remedies available under the general law. Again, this raises potential for
the misleading of consumers, especially those who do not have a firm
understanding of how smart contracts operate.85
II.

GOVERNING THE INTERFACE BETWEEN NATURAL AND FORMAL LANGUAGE
IN SMART CONTRACTS

Building on the above discussion of the challenges of translating
concepts and principles into code, and the corresponding tension between
the formal language of computers and the natural language of contract, it
is useful to consider whether, and to what extent, these challenges have
been addressed through legal reform. In the last two decades, nations
around the world have enacted legislation to address the challenges created
by electronic contracts. While no nation has enacted legislation to regulate
smart contracts, it is useful to examine the extent to which electronic
contract laws address the legal challenges relating to smart contracts. The
84. See Raskin, supra note 60, at 325.
85. In addition to the issues discussed, there is the further challenge of enforcing smart
contracts in the international sphere and the challenges of governing the seamless
internet with jurisdictional rules that align to the geographical sovereign borders of
nations. This issue of internet jurisdiction is outside the ambit of the present discussion.
See generally Niloufer Selvadurai, The Proper Basis for Exercising Jurisdiction in Internet
Disputes: Strengthening State Boundaries or Moving Towards Unification?, 13 PITT. J. TECH.
LAW L. & POL’Y 124 (2013); see also Bedrettin Gürcan, Jurisdiction on the Blockchain, in
CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS OF THE OXFORD CONFERENCE SERIES: MARCH 2020 14 (2020),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/345176938_JURISDICTION_ON_THE_BLOCK
CHAIN (specifically discussing jurisdiction on blockchain-based smart contracts); Karen
Yeung, Blockchain, Transactional Security and the Promise of Automated Law Enforcement: The
Withering of Freedom Under Law?, in 3TH1CS: A REINVENTION OF ETHICS IN THE DIGITAL
AGE 1, 13 (Philipp Otto & Eike Gräf eds., 2017).
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jurisdictions of the United States and Australia have been selected for
analysis because they have relatively sophisticated electronic contracts laws
and have a mature law reform discourse considering further enhancements.
The European Union’s e-Commerce Directive has also been selected for
analysis because it provides useful insights to overcoming the contractual
challenges generated by automation.86 It may be useful to highlight our
conclusions at the outset: as countries have enabled electronic contracting,
including smart contracting, they have adopted the paradigm that such
contracts express human expectation, and they have rejected both expressly
and by implication the emerging trend of holding human expectations
hostage to machine outcomes. Or, simply put, these frameworks support
our conclusion that where human expectations denoted in natural language
differ from machine outcomes expressed in formal computing code,
expectations prevail.
As both the United States and Australia have adopted many of the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
enactments relating to electronic commerce, there is a degree of harmony
between these two nations.87 The United States, Australia, and certain
European Union nations have enacted domestic legislation to give effect to
the UNICTRAL provisions. And several of these jurisdictions have enacted
further specific laws to support electronic commerce.
The most widely enacted UNCITRAL model law, the UNCITRAL
Model Law on Electronic Commerce,88 is based on the principles of

86. Directive 2000/31/EC, of the 0001 – 0016.European Parliament and of the Council of 8
June 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular
Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market, 2000 O.J. (L 178).
87. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L. [UNCITRAL], United Nations Convention on the Use
of Electronic Communications in International Contracts, U.N. Sales No. E.07.V.2 (2005),
2007; together with the UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Transferable
Records (2017), U.N. Sales No. E.17.V.5 (2018) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Electronic
Transferable Records]; UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures
(with Guide to Enactment 2001), U.N. Sales No. E.02.V.8 (2002) [hereinafter UNCITRAL
Electronic Signatures]; and the UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic
Commerce with Guide to Enactment (1996) with Additional Article 5 Bis, as Adopted in
1998, U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.4 (1999) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Electronic Commerce].
These all facilitate electronic commerce and have been adopted by over 100 nations.
88. UNCITRAL Electronic Commerce, supra note 87.
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technology neutrality and nondiscrimination against the use of electronic
means. It recognises the functional equivalence of contracts made by
electronic and paper-based means. Additional rules on the use of electronic
signatures are provided by the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic
Signatures.89 More recently, the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic
Transferable Records90 recognises the use of electronic transferable
documents, including bills of exchange, bills of lading, cheques, and
promissory notes. Most recently, the UNCITRAL Notes on the Main Issues
of Cloud Computing Contracts91 considers the development of an
instrument on the use and cross border recognition of electronic identity
management services (IdM services) and authentication services (trust
services).
A thread runs through these statutes and the ones that follow:
electronic contract, including smart contract, is subject to the regular rules
of contracting practice. The rule is one of equivalence, not exceptionalism.
Across the board, enabling statutes have determined that the principles of
contract doctrine extend to online and electronic practices. Although this
principle may seem almost pedestrian (and the statutes that enshrine it are
certainly not flashy), the implications of this point are far-reaching. We
must enable true contracting doctrine in smart contracts. Neither the
statutory or case law have a legitimate basis for smart contract
exceptionalism, for the exclusion of the practice of discerning human intent
from the language, facts, and circumstances surrounding a smart contract.
In the United States, state and federal common law, together with
specific statutory laws governing certain types of contracts, govern the
formation and enforcement of contracts. The Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) proposed Article 12 may develop an equivalence between smartcontract-transferred assets and intangible assets subject to control (as used
in Article 8 governing securities, for example). The state Uniform Electronic
Transactions Act (UETA) applies to contracts that have been enacted in a
digital format for which the contracting parties have “agreed to conduct

89. UNCITRAL Electronic Signatures, supra note 87
90. UNCITRAL Electronic Transferable Records, supra note 87.
91. UNCITRAL, Notes on the Main Issues of Cloud Computing Contracts, 2019 U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/974, U.N. Sales No. Not Printed (2019).
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transactions by electronic means.”92 The federal Electronic Signatures in
Global and National Commerce Act (ESIGN)93 contains further provisions
as to the recognition and authentication of electronic signatures and
electronic records.
While these statutes do not expressly refer to smart contracts, the broad
references to digital format encompass blockchain-based smart contracts.
They operate to prevent a contract from being denied legal effect solely
because it is in an electronic form. Hence, the use of a blockchain platform
will not affect validity. The UETA and ESIGN operate to further ensure that
an electronic signature will satisfy legal requirements as to signature, and
that an electronic record will satisfy the requirement for a record to be in
writing. Cryptographic signatures used in blockchain are thus electronic
signatures. Further information stored on the distributed ledger will be
legally recognised as an electronic record.
But, while these provisions operate to uphold the contractual validity
of blockchain transactions, they do not offer a solution to the problems of
discerning intent and ensuring performance discussed above. The statutes
thus entrench some of the problems caused by immutability discussed
above.94 Further it is relevant to note that the UETA and ESIGN framework
does not grant legal effect to all electronic contracts: A variety of exemptions
apply to the use of electronic signatures with respect to, for example, the
formation of wills, codicils, testamentary trusts, official court documents,
and documents related to family law matters. Accordingly, blockchainbased contracts in these areas may not be recognised, despite the fact that
using a smart contract to transfer assets upon the occurrence of a easily
discernible event (e.g., death) is a core application of the technology.
In Australia, the federal Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (ETA),95
mirrored by the various State and Territory Acts, also operate to give formal
recognition to contracts made using electronic means. The stated aim of the
ETA is to provide a regulatory framework to facilitate and support e-

92. Unif. Elec. Transactions Act § 5(b) (Unif. L. Comm’n 1999).
93. 15 U.S.C. § 7001.
94. See id.
95. Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth) (Austl.).
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commerce, inspire public confidence in electronic trading, and enable
“businesses and the community to use electronic communications in their
dealings with government.”96 More specifically, it aims to eliminate barriers
to the conduct of electronic transactions and ensure that a transaction
would not be unenforceable because it was created in an electronic
environment.97 As the Act governs “information systems,” defined as
“systems for generating, sending, receiving, storing or otherwise
processing electronic communications,”98 it would encompass blockchain
platforms. While its definition of “electronic communication” is technology
specific, being “a communication of information in the form of data, text or
images by means of guided and/or unguided electromagnetic energy . . . ,”
it would encompass blockchain transactions. And while the definition of
“data storage device” is likewise technology specific, defined to be “any
article or material (for example, a disk) from which information is capable
of being reproduced, with or without the aid of any other article or device,”
it would encompass distributed ledgers.
As with its equivalent in the United States, the Australian legislation
mandates the functional equivalence of electronic and paper contracts,
stipulating that a transaction cannot be denied legal effectiveness because
it is wholly or partly created by the use of electronic communications.99
Electronic communications are stipulated to satisfy the writing requirement
and requirements as to electronic signatures.100 Special provisions as to
presumptions applying to time and place of dispatch and receipt101 help
clarify the application of traditional contract law principles to electronic
transactions. Of course, this general rule can be displaced by a more specific
provision in the Act.102

96. Id. § 3.
97. Id.
98. Id. § 5.
99. Id. § 8(1).
100. Id. § 10.
101. Id. §§ 14–14B.
102. Id. § 8(2). As with the United States equivalent, the Australian Act does not
recognize electronic signatures for certain prescribed transactions, including wills.
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In the European Union, the e-Commerce Directive103 forms the
foundational governance framework for online services, creating
harmonised rules to support transparency in the provision of online
services and facilitate commercial communications and electronic contracts.
In Section 3 on Contracts concluded by electronic means, Article 9.1
provides that “Member States shall ensure that their legal system allows
contracts to be concluded by electronic means.” Member States shall, in
particular, ensure that the legal requirements applicable to the contractual
process neither create obstacles to the use of electronic contracts nor result
in such contracts being deprived of legal effectiveness and validity on
account of their having been made by electronic means. Article 9.2 further
provides:
Member States may lay down that paragraph 1 shall not apply to all or
certain contracts falling into one of the following categories: (a) contracts
that create or transfer rights in real estate, except for rental rights; (b)
contracts requiring by law the involvement of courts, public authorities or
professions exercising public authority; (c) contracts of suretyship granted
and on collateral securities furnished by persons acting for purposes
outside their trade, business or profession; (d) contracts governed by family
law or by the law of succession.104
“Electronic contract” is not defined in Article 2, but the breadth of the
term seems to encompass smart contracts which can be run automatically.
Therefore, while the United States’ UETA and ESIGN, the Australian
ETA, and the European e-Commercial Directive provide a measure of legal
and commercial certainty to the use of blockchain-based contracts, they do
not solve the fundamental problems raised above.105 A more developed
governance framework is required. This will be the focus of the next Part of
this Article.
III.

TOWARDS A NEW LEGAL FRAMEWORK TO GOVERN THE INTERFACE
BETWEEN NATURAL AND FORMAL LANGUAGE IN SMART CONTRACTS
A. Indicia for Judging the Effectiveness of Smart Contract Law

103. Directive 2000/31/EC, supra note 86.
104. Id. art. 9.2.
105. See supra Part I.

111

2022

UCLA J.L. & TECH.

Vol. 27:2

When natural language human expectations for legal arrangements
conflict with the inevitably buggy emergent nature of code, especially
where bugs are actively exploited by humans, what happens? When a
hacker exploits vulnerabilities in the DAO to extract investors’ money,
should the community have the right to fork the currency to set the clock
back?106 Moreover, should community members have causes of action in
unjust enrichment, money had and received, conversion, or replevin
against counterparties who exploit software vulnerabilities? Blockchain is
a community coordination technology, and blockchain agreements often
operate to benefit communities whose members come and go. Contract is a
mode intended to capture an agreement at a specific time and place
between specified parties. How should courts respond to legal language
buried in code, where no human sees it, or code buried in legal language,
where few humans can understand it (and none can be sure of its
operation)?
Our approach is marked by a few signposts. First, we believe
contracting must remain a human-centered activity. Courts should reject
the rising trend of treating exploits in blockchain contractual arrangements
as expressions of the deal human counterparties wanted. Second, we
believe that progress is best made by building on and extending common
law and historically established legislative approaches for blockchainbased negotiated agreement rather than attempting to build a new law from
scratch. Third, we recognize wrinkles created by the technology
(immutability and the community nature of these arrangements foremost
among them) but believe these can be addressed best by looking to what
humans wished to do—the expressions of their agreement in natural
language—rather than looking to software outcomes.
In order to develop a new governance framework for smart contracts,
it is first necessary to establish appropriate criteria for judging effective
laws in this area. Analyzing the issue through a technical lens, some have
suggested that the ontological suitability of a SCL can be judged using two

106. Because a blockchain is a ledger with an immutable history—what was written
cannot be unwritten—the only way to correct gross errors on the chain itself is to “fork”
the chain; that is, the community accepts that a new record, a new chain, is the one true
accepted chain, and the old record is disregarded by the software. This has been used in
both the case of the DAO and the Icon exploit to revert or freeze assets that a hacker used
an exploit to obtain. See Penzo & Selvadurai, supra note 78.
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indicia. First, the appropriateness of “the choreography or workflow of
processes” in the SCL in relation to concepts. Second, the appropriateness
of the semantics that define processes in relation to properties.107 But what
legal lens should be used to identify such criteria? As discussed earlier,
Lessig famously postulated that code is law:
The code regulates. It implements values, or not. It enables
freedoms, or disables them. It protects privacy, or promotes
monitoring. . . . Thus the choice is not whether people will
decide how cyberspace regulates. People—coders—will.
The only choice is whether we collectively will have a role in
their choice.108
Of course, a number of scholars have however contested this notion.
One such scholar proposes there are two distinct aspects of code’s
relationship with law.109 The first—Lessig’s concept “that computer code
can substitute for law or other forms of regulation”—must be accompanied
by the second: an understanding of how code can operate as an “antiregulatory mechanism,” a tool that certain groups will use to their
advantage to minimise the costs of legal compliance.110 This scholar
suggests that the design of code should be studied as just one aspect of
interest group behavior.
Extending this notion, another scholar proposes a sharp analytical
distinction between the realms of technology and of law, arguing that while
“[t]he question to what extent the law ‘can’ be digitalized relates to
technology, whereas the question to what extent it ‘may’ be digitalized falls

107. E.g., Dwivedi et al., supra note 44; see also Alex Norta et al., eContractual ChoreographyLanguage Properties Towards Cross-Organizational Business Collaboration, 6 J. INTERNET
SERVS. & APPLICATIONS, no. 8, 2015, https://doi.org/10.1186/s13174-015-0023-7.
108. Lawrence Lessig, Code Is Law: On Liberty in Cyberspace, HARV. MAG. (Jan. 1 2020),
https://www.harvardmagazine.com/2000/01/code-is-law-html; see also Lessig, supra note
52.
109. Tim Wu, When Code Isn’t Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 682 (2003).
110. Id.
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within the realm of the law.”111 While Lessig’s first intuition that law is being
replaced by automation is largely true, his second implication—that this
makes machine code equivalent to legal understandings—is wholly
inaccurate, and forms the foundation of what has gone wrong in the law
and theory of smart contracting.
Still, other scholarly works have analysed the intersection between
conventional law produced and enforced by national legal systems—the
“code of law”—and the internal rules of blockchain systems which form
executable software code and cryptographic algorithms which operate
across distributed computing networks, or “code as law.”112 But, while this
scholar concludes that the success of blockchain will depend on “effective
and legitimate governance structures,” encompassing “both the code that
controls the operation of digital technologies (code as law) as well as the
conventional rules provided by national legal systems (code of law),”113
precise guidance is not provided on the potential nature and operation of
such “effective and legitimate governance structures.”
B. A New Legal Framework to Govern the Interface between Formal and
Natural Language of Smart Contracts
To effectively proceed, we stress the similarity of contractual
arrangements through blockchain to regular everyday contracts (since it is
only through this law of contract that an arrangement can obtain legal
validity), with specific reference to satisfying human preferences through
the division of consumer surplus as a result of negotiated agreement.
Humans want something out of smart contracts, and the law should tend
to ensure that they get it. The law of unconscionability should minimize
oppression and surprise, as it always has. The law of good faith and fair
dealing should continue to operate to penalize contracting parties who
exploit software bugs to subvert the expectations of the parties. Courts will
need to interpret contract terms for their objective meaning between the
parties rather than rely on the operation of code. Courts will need to admit
parol evidence regarding the actual understanding of the parties to
agreements expressed in code—formal code, particularly buggy formal

111. Jan Oster, Code is Code and Law is Law—The Law of Digitalization and the Digitalization
of Law, 29 INT’L J. LAW L. & INFO. TECH., 101, 101 (2021).
112. Karen Yeung, Regulation by Blockchain: The Emerging Battle for Supremacy Between the
Code of Law and Code as Law, 82 MOD. L. REV. 207, 207 (2019).
113. See id. at 239 (emphasis omitted).
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code, has no expression of meaning for oral or extrinsic evidence to
contradict.
We believe an iterative, experimental, and humble analysis based on
analogy to regular contracting practice will yield better results than tech
evangelism. Blockchain is a database in which human preferences can be
recorded in natural language and executed in code. Where the two diverge,
courts can take steps to align the execution of the contract with the
expectation of the parties.
In particular, this requires specific legal moves with respect to the
interface between natural language and formal language. At a minimum,
courts should focus on and privilege natural language expressions of the
intent of the parties, particularly those that show indicia of dickered
consent. Courts should disfavor boilerplate buried in the code of a smart
contract where no human can see it, and should question the value of
assuming that where a human and computer meet and exchange text, that
the machine-proffered version should prevail. Courts should take seriously
the fact that human intent cannot be perfectly expressed in code, since both
internal bugs and external emergent interactions with other software can
always create variance between intent and execution. And the concept of a
contract that cannot be breached is both legal nonsense and likely violates
rules against exculpation—why would one have the legal form at all if the
mechanical operation of a software program were synonymous with legal
performance?
Once a background rule of similarity through analogy and a human
focus are established, courts can more easily deal with the few and
relatively unimportant differences between contracts expressed in natural
language and automatically executed via blockchain, and any other
database technology. The first key technological difference is immutability.
Imagine Anne forces Bill, at gunpoint (or by fraud, or by software exploit),
to authenticate a smart contract transfer of the digital Mona Lisa. The form
of the transaction will look like any other transaction executed by smart
contract. Bill will want the Mona Lisa back. Of course, courts should protect
Bill’s interests despite the facially valid contractual transfer. It is true that
the transfer will be immutably recorded on the blockchain, but this is no
bar to sane adjudication. If a court can reach Anne or her assets, it can
impose sanctions requiring her to produce and return the NFT. If it cannot,
it cannot force the blockchain to recognize the transfer. But neither can a
court force the return of a physical asset if it cannot find the asset or the
perpetrator. And in the meantime, the perfect provenance of blockchain
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technology will render the digital Mona Lisa dead in the commercial water:
everyone will know it is stolen, and any transfer of the asset would be a
public transaction recorded on the blockchain. In short, immutability
creates no more problem for NFTs than it does in any other circumstance of
force, fraud, or the like.
The most significant challenge to evolving common law and historical
legislative contract doctrine to cover smart contracts will be problems of
community. Contracts are a form intended to capture the intentions of two
or more parties at a given moment in time for a set expectation in the future.
That is not at all to say that contracts cannot be long-term fluid
arrangements between larger groups, but merely that some innovation will
be required to standardize such practice. The natural language expression
of the intentions of parties who engage in smart contracting will likely be
EULA-style framework contracts that set the rules of the road, similar to a
master trading agreement, a constitution for the online community, or the
master agreements for electronic data interchange. The question of whether
natural language or automatic execution should be deemed the expression
of the parties’ intent is less problematic in these scenarios, with the law of
boilerplate fairly well established. The harder question will be enabling
contractual rights between people who enter the community at different
times, with promises that are not directly reciprocal to one another (that is,
both owe contractual duties to the community to refrain from exploitation
or token duplication). There are problems of third-party beneficiaries and
of virality. Imagine Alan gives Meg cryptocurrency governed by a
community constitution. Alan is likely bound by the constitution because
he purchased the tokens through a website, or because he downloaded the
community’s wallet app. But the degree to which Meg is bound is unclear.
Yet even this hardest problem is hardly insurmountable if courts
follow the approach espoused here. It may simply require a foray into the
law of rights in things—common law property. Contracts can set rights that
travel with property, and if those rights are properly recorded (there is no
better technology for doing so than blockchain), then successors in interest
can be bound despite not signing on to the original community contractual
agreement.
There are more examples than this relatively brief Article can contain.
The heart of our approach is to reject technological exceptionalism for
blockchain-based contracting, and to reject the idea that code expresses
human meaning in the way that natural language does. It demonstrably
does not, and indeed cannot. Natural language contracts cannot be reduced
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to code—not even a simple, commercial impracticability clause can be so
expressed. And smart contracts cannot obtain legal validity other than
through the law of contract, which is powered by human expectations
expressed in natural language. Once courts understand these key facts, they
unlock the ability to draw on the bank of analogous common law doctrines
and historical examples of legislation to iterate contracting practice
conducted in this new medium.
Conclusion
This Article suggests that the modern trend of assuming that humans
intend whatever computers in fact do when they transact via decentralized
ledger technology does not fit well with the law of contract. Smart contracts
may act, but they do not intend. Nor do their bugs and emergent behaviors
suggest intention that should be protected by law. We thus need a law of
contracts that understands the distinction between natural and formal
languages, between human expression and machine code, between
contractual intent and contract execution.
Through the adoption of such a governance framework, the computer
mechanism that generates the terms of the contract and forms the formal
language of computer code can be better aligned with the natural language
of the contract. If a human makes a mistake in contracting by smart
contract, the law of mistake should be applied. If the automated system
encounters an un-codeable event of force majeure, impossibility,
impracticability, or frustration of purpose, then those doctrines ought to
apply to contracts automatically executed by computers through
decentralized ledgers just as they apply to contracts automatically executed
by any other means.
Moreover, we must recognize that the blockchain enthusiast’s dream
of displacing law through automated execution cannot reduce the role of
human understanding and community expectations, processes, and norms.
Nor should it. The community—not code—will return NFTs to rightful
owners even though they are conveyed to fraudsters via code exploits. The
community—not code—will hard-fork blockchains to stop disasters like the
DAO. Courts will order rescission of contracts paid for in cryptocurrency,
and the return of NFTs obtained through technologically valid transactions
that are nevertheless caused by force or fraud. The examples multiply, but
the solution is in each case the same. Computer systems cannot reach
outside of themselves to square actions with intention. For that function—
and it is the only function of contract law, after all—we will need courts
117

2022

UCLA J.L. & TECH.

Vol. 27:2

ready to interpret the intent of the parties and correctly manage the
interface between the language of law and the language of code.
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